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ARTICLES
How Early Did Anglo-American
Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to
Schechter’s Conundrum
Keith M. Stolte*
It is possible that some day in some moldering mass of unpublished records of the common law may be found a report of a case
in the reign of Elizabeth by a clothier for infringement of his trademark that will justify the authority with which Southern v. How has
been so unanimously endowed.
—Frank I. Schechter1
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INTRODUCTION
There is a new entry in the law books as the oldest reported
trademark case in Anglo-American law. It is known as Sandforth’s Case.2 Ironically, it was discovered through an obscure ref2. Sandforth’s Case, Cory’s Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168 (1584) (providing a fairly complete portion of the complaint), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C.
MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY—PRIVATE LAW TO 1750 615-18 (1986);
HLS MS. 2071, fo. 86 (providing a brief abstract of the case), reprinted in BAKER &
MILSOM, supra, at 615-18; HLS MS. 5048 fo. 118v. (formerly catalogued as HLS MS.
Acc. 704755, fo 118v.) (providing another brief abstract of the case), reprinted in BAKER
& MILSOM, supra, at 615. Other unpublished references to the case are found in CUL
MS. Ii 5. 38, fo. 132; HLS MS. 2074, fo. 84v.; and BL MS. Lansdowne 1086, fo. 74v.
There is a discrepancy among the six sources as to the name of the case. For example, in
BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. the name of the case is apparently Sandford’s Case.
J.H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH HISTORY 385 n.45 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter
ENGLISH HISTORY I]. In CUL MS. Ii. 5. 38, fo. 132, the case name is Samforde, and in
HLS MS. 2074, fo. 84v, it is Sandforth’s Case. In view of this conflict, and intending to
modernize the name of the case, Professor Baker chose to name the case J.G. v. Samford
in the 1990 edition of his book Introduction to English History. J.H. BAKER,
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH HISTORY 522 n.68 (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter ENGLISH
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reference in a seventeenth century lawsuit that previously claimed
the title of oldest trademark case.
History has generally honored Southern v. How,3 decided in
1618, as the first reported trademark case in Anglo-American
law4—despite the fact it was not a trademark case at all, but one
that involved the sale of counterfeit jewels.5 Its connection with
trademark law arose out of Judge Dodderidge’s dictum in that
case, wherein the learned judge made a brief reference to an earlier, unnamed and apparently unreported case that involved a suit
brought against a cloth maker who used another cloth maker’s
mark.6 That lawsuit—published as Sandforth’s Case—may now
be declared the earliest reported trademark case in AngloAmerican law.
For four centuries, the obscure reference made in Southern v.
How served as the foundation for all subsequent trademark law
and, more broadly, the law of unfair competition.7 But Southern v.
How provides a feeble and problematic basis for the development
of the law of trademarks and unfair competition in England, the
British Commonwealth, and the United States. For example, some
prominent scholars, particularly Frank Schechter,8 argue that the

HISTORY II]. To preserve the historical quality of the case, this Article uses the name designated in HLS MS. 2074, fo. 84., that is, Sandforth’s Case.
3. Popham’s Reports 143 (1618), 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1907); J. Bridgeman’s
Reports 125 (1659), 123 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1912); Cro. Jac. 468 (1659), 79 Eng. Rep.
400 (K.B. 1907); 2 Rolle’s Reports 5 (1676), 81 Eng. Rep. 621 (K.B. 1908); 2 Rolle’s
Reports 26 (1676), 81 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B. 1908).
4. See JEROME GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMUELS, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND
PRACTICE § 1.01[1] (1997); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS,
TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 15-16 (4th ed. 1924); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (1996); EDWARD S.
ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 34 (1914); SCHECHTER, supra
note 1, at 6-9.
5. Southern v. How, Popham’s Reports at 143, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1243-44.
6. Id. at 144, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1244.
7. See GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 5:2;
SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 5-6, 9, 123.
8. The scholarly contributions made by Frank Schechter during the 1920’s have significantly influenced the law of trademarks during the twentieth century, especially in the
United States. Most trademark practitioners know of Schechter as the father of the doctrine of trademark dilution. His 1927 law review article, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927), was the first to propose the dilution the-
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case is practically worthless in demonstrating that the common law
of trademarks developed any earlier than the advent of the Industrial Revolution.9 Schechter has declared Sykes v. Sykes,10 decided
in 1824, to be “the first reported case squarely involving the protection of trade-marks by an English common law court.”11 Many
other scholars and the courts are less assertive; they simply tend to
avoid the question as to the availability of relief for trademark infringement or unfair competition prior to the nineteenth century.12

ory that has occupied so much of the scholarly literature on trademark law in the last 40
years. Less known is Schechter’s seminal work on the history of trademarks, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks, supra note 1, which is still unsurpassed as the most comprehensive and reliable authority on the subject.
The following anecdote serves as a testament to the importance of Schechter’s historical work in the area of trademark scholarship and demonstrates that even Oliver
Wendell Holmes recognized Schechter’s contribution:
Though the Court was in recess, Holmes was formally attired in the cutaway,
striped trousers, and stiff bosom shirt with a winged collar. He sat at his desk
on the fourth floor of his home overlooking the garden. The two justices
[Holmes and Justice Stone] did most of the talking . . . . Turning to Stone,
Holmes observed that in the course of writing an opinion in a trademark case,
he had occasion to read a fascinating book on the history of the law and usage
of trademarks. Stone inquired whether Holmes was referring to a doctoral dissertation by Frank Schechter on the historical foundations of the law of trademarks. Holmes responded that that was the book he had in mind. Stone then
told him that he had persuaded Schechter, who was trademark counsel for the
BVD company, to take a year off from his practice and to be the first candidate
for a doctoral degree in law at Columbia. When Holmes learned that Stone had
inspired the writing of this book, he rose, walked across the room, shook
Stone’s hand and said, “I congratulate you on one of the great acts of your life.”
Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 270-71 (1985) (citation omitted). Even
Milton Handler, who has severely criticized Schechter’s theory of trademark dilution,
acknowledged that Schechter’s book on the history of trademarks inspired his own impressive career in the trademark field from 1927 to the present. Id. at 271.
9. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 8-10, 123 (criticizing the reliance of courts and
legal commentators on Southern v. How as the initial basis for Anglo-American trademark law and the law of unfair competition due to the unavailing mysteries created by
differing reports of the case).
10. 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B. 1824).
11. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 137.
12. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 6-10, 123; see also discussion infra notes 5075 and accompanying text (providing a historical demonstration of how the courts and
trademark scholars have treated the case). Schechter, who argued that the usage and
regulation of trademarks by medieval and renaissance guilds established the antiquity of
trademark law in England and throughout Europe, nevertheless stated that most commen-
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We can now dispense altogether with Southern v. How, in favor of Sandforth’s Case. There is now little doubt that Sandforth’s
Case was the very case to which Judge Dodderidge made brief reference in Southern v. How.13 Sandforth’s Case conclusively demonstrates that the English courts recognized a common law right
against trademark infringement as early as 1584, some two hundred and fifty years before the Industrial Revolution caused a surge
in the development of this area of the law on both sides of the Atlantic.14 Ironically, like Southern v. How, one of the two extant abstracts of Sandforth makes brief reference to an unreported case
involving counterfeiting activity, apparently heard in the House of
Commons in 1558.15 While it may be another four hundred years
before this even earlier case surfaces, the brief treatment of the parliamentary action in Sandforth’s Case strengthens the conclusion
that trademark infringement and unfair competition was a violation
of English law as early as the mid-sixteenth century.
This Article introduces Sandforth’s Case to practitioners and
trademark scholars and provides a brief analysis of the case, particularly in the contexts of sixteenth century commerce and law reporting. Part I explores the problems posed by, and the historical
treatment accorded to, the brief reference of the case that appeared
in Southern v. How. Part II introduces Sandforth’s Case as the true

tators assign the origin of the common law protection of trademarks to the early nineteenth century. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 11, 16. According to Schechter:
[T]hose who have attained pre-eminence either as practitioners or as textwriters of trade-mark law have with few exceptions been quite content to regard that law as practically the creation of the nineteenth century, without attempting in any way to ascertain the extent to which trade-marks had been used
prior to the nineteenth century, the functions or purposes which these trademarks had served and the methods, if any, by which they came under any form
of legal protection or surveillance.
Id.; see also DUNCAN MACKENZIE KERLY, LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 2
(5th ed. 1923) (stating that “[t]he law on this subject cannot be traced back further than
the nineteenth century”); SEBASTIAN, TRADE MARK REGISTRATION 3 (2d ed. 1922) (stating that “it is possible that this right [to trademark protection] was recognized as early as
the reign of Queen Elizabeth; it was at any rate established in 1833”).
13. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617 n.18.
14. See infra notes 101-142 and accompanying text (providing a comprehensive
analysis of Sandforth’s Case).
15. Sandforth’s Case, Cory’s Entries, HLS MS. 5048, fo. 118v, reprinted in BAKER
& MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615.
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foundation of Anglo-American trademark law, yet never cited by
any English or American court. Part III explores the impact of
Sandforth’s Case and demonstrates that it clearly established
trademark infringement as a violation of sixteenth century common
law. This Article concludes that Sandforth’s Case is the bridge,
sought by legal scholars, between trademark regulation by the medieval English trade guilds and the birth of modern trademark jurisprudence in the common law courts of the nineteenth century.
I. SOUTHERN V. HOW: THE BASIS OF TRADEMARK LAW OR “AN
IRRELEVANT DICTUM OF A REMINISCENT JUDGE”?
For centuries, the case of Southern v. How has been subject to
significant controversy.16 The question at the center of this unending debate is whether the case demonstrates that the English common law of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cultivated a tort
of trademark infringement and unfair competition, or whether the
case should be discarded as nothing more than a vehicle for an irrelevant, highly ambiguous piece of legal gossip.17 Whatever the
answer was during the 380 year period since the case was first
heard, there is no question that, until now, Southern v. How has
been universally regarded as the first to make reference to an action at law involving what we would call trademark infringement.18
A. The Reporting of Southern v. How
Southern v. How has historically engendered controversy as to
its value in the development of Anglo-American trademark law
because the case was reported in at least five abstracts by four different chroniclers at five different times.19 As one may expect,
each of the five versions of the case differs in its treatment of an
16. See discussion infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text (analyzing the continuing controversy on the relevance of the case to origins of trademark law).
17. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 7-12, 123-26 (characterizing the import of the
case in the development of Anglo-American law of trademarks as “an irrelevant dictum
of a reminiscent judge”).
18. See GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at §
5:2; SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9-11.
19. See discussion infra notes 21-48 and accompanying text (examining the five
reported versions of the case); see also supra note 3 (citing the five versions of Sandforth’s Case).
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earlier, unnamed, unreported case during the reign of Elizabeth I.
Two of the versions do not even mention the earlier case; of the
three that do make reference to the earlier case, one indicates that
the senior user of the infringed mark was the plaintiff in the case,
while two state that the plaintiff was a purchaser of the infringing
goods. The differing versions do not even agree on the year the
case was decided.20
The first published abstract of Southern v. How appeared in
Popham’s Reports in 1656.21 That report assigns the decision to
Trinity term, 15 Jac. I,22 that is, 1618. The case was a suit heard by
the King’s Bench involving a civil charge of deceit. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, through his servant, sold him counterfeit jewels.
Although Southern v. How was not in any sense a case involving trademarks, Judge Dodderidge recalled in dicta an earlier case,
which he assumed to be an action heard on the tort of deceit.23
According to the abstract in Popham’s Report, that earlier action
was brought in the Court of Common Pleas by a “clothier,” who
(1) had gained a “great reputation” as a skilled clothier, (2) “had

20. In fact, there is a discrepancy between the five abstracts even as to the year that
Southern v. How was heard.
21. Popham’s Reports 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243. Popham’s Reports is an important
collection of numerous abstracts of early common law cases. But the author, Popham,
did not report the case of Southern v. How, which was actually published after his death.
The abstract had been reported presumably by successors of Popham’s enterprise and included in the book under a section entitled “Some Remarkable Cases Reported by Other
Learned Pens Since His Death.”
22. The term “15 Jac. I” refers to the 15th year of the reign of James I.
23. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the
common law tort of deceit during the sixteenth century). According to the opinion reported in Popham’s Reports:
Dod[d]eridge said, that 22 Eliz., the action upon the case was brought in the
[Court of] Common Pleas by a clothier, that whereas he had gained great reputation for his making of his cloth by reason whereof he had great utterance to
his benefit and profit, and that he used to set his mark on his cloth whereby it
should be known to be his cloth; and another clothier, observing it, used the
same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose to deceive him, and it was resolved
that the action did well lie.
Southern v. How, Popham’s Reports, at 144, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1244. The term “22 Eliz.”
refers to the twenty-second year of the reign of Elizabeth I, that is, 1580.
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great utterance to his benefit and profit,”24 and (3) affixed “his
mark on his cloth whereby it should be known to be his cloth,”
against another clothier who, upon “observing [the other clothier’s
mark], used the same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose to deceive him.”25 In that case, “it was resolved that the action did well
lie.”26
The abstract of Southern v. How in Popham’s Reports makes
clear that the plaintiff in the earlier, unnamed case is the senior
trademark user and not a consumer, but the reference appears to
state that the action was one that fit into the developing doctrine of
tortious deceit.27 There is no indication in the abstract that the case
occupied a new cause of action for trademark infringement or unfair competition, though this is a possibility.28 Nevertheless, Dod24. Id. The phrase “great utterance” undoubtedly means the clothier attained a high
level of fame for his cloths and success in his business. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L
DICTIONARY 2526 (1986) (defining utterance as “the sale or disposal (as of goods or
commodities) to the public”).
25. Popham’s Reports, at 144, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1244.
26. Id.
27. The tort of deceit has a long and meandering history. Over time, a line of cases
generated a doctrine that an action for deceit would lie where a seller of merchandise
warranted the quality or character of his merchandise, but later delivered goods of lesser
quality. Some early cases also required privity, or a relation of trust, between the parties
at suit. See, e.g., BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 506-23.
28. At this period of English legal history, a warranty of quality and some form of
privity between the parties were usually required before an action for deceit would lie.
See supra note 27 (discussing prior and contemporaneous cases that require a warranty
and privity for the tort of deceit in commercial transactions); see also Paula J. Dalley, The
Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 41213 (1995) (stating that during the Medieval and Renaissance periods, the tort of deceit
required proof of a warranty). According to Dalley, Southern v. How was the only reported case of the period in which an action laid for deceit, merely on the basis of the defendant’s scienter, without any showing of a warranty. Id. at 412-13. Some cases, however, appear to have sounded in deceit where no warranty existed but where the
defendant had actual knowledge that the merchandise sold contained a defect. See
Caryll’s Reports, Keil 91, pl. 16 (1505). Despite this anomaly, ordinarily the cases of the
period required a warranty. The account in Popham’s indicates that the plaintiff was the
senior user of the mark and makes no mention of any warranty made by either party or
any prior relationship of trust or privity. Southern v. How, Popham’s Reports 144, 79
Eng. Rep. 1244. It may be that the common law tort of commercial deceit was expanding
at this time to include cases where no warranty or privity needed to exist between the parties. Alternatively, the unnamed case Dodderidge cited may have recognized a new
cause of action, beyond the established common law tort of deceit. See discussion infra
notes 143-151 and accompanying text for an analysis of this possibility.
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deridge appears to characterize the action as an intentional deceit
on the senior trademark user by the defendant.
The second report of Southern v. How appeared in J. Bridgeman’s Reports, published in 1659, four years after the Popham’s
version appeared.29 The Bridgeman’s abstract cites Southern v.
How as decided in 1616,30 two years before the date ascribed by
the abstract in Popham’s Reports. This report of the case makes
no reference to Judge Dodderidge’s discussion of the earlier clothier’s case, and is therefore of little use except to demonstrate the
inconsistencies in the five reports of Southern v. How.
The third abstract of the case was published in Croke’s Reports, also in 1659.31 The Croke’s version, like that in Popham’s,
indicates that Southern v. How was heard in the year 1618 and, like
the abstract in Popham’s, it included a reference to Judge Dodderidge’s discussion in dicta of an earlier clothier’s case. The
Croke’s version of the earlier clothier’s case, however, contains
striking inconsistencies with the Popham’s version.
According to the version in Croke’s Reports, Judge Dodderidge referred to a case from the Court of Common Pleas, in which
(1) “a clothier of Gloucestershire sold very good cloth, so that in
London if they saw any cloth of his mark they would buy it without searching thereof;”32 (2) “another who made ill cloth put his

29. Southern v. How, J. Bridgeman’s Reports, 125, 123 Eng. Rep. 1248.
30. The abstract indicates that the case was heard during the Hilary Term, “13 Jac.
I,” that is, during the thirteenth year of the reign of James I.
31. Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 468, 79 Eng. Rep. 400. According to Croke’s Reports:
Dodderidge cited a case to be adjudged 33 Eliz. in the [Court of] Common
Pleas: a clothier of Gloucestershire sold very good cloth, so that in London if
they saw any cloth of his mark they would buy it without searching thereof; and
another who made ill cloth put his mark upon it without his [the senior user’s]
privity; and an action upon the case was brought by him who bought the cloth,
for this deceit; and adjudged maintainable.
Id. at 471, 79 Eng. Rep. at 402. The term “33 Eliz.” indicates that the case was heard
during the thirty-third year of the reign of Elizabeth I, that is, in 1591.
32. Id. Presumably the term “they” means consumers or retailers of cloth. As a
whole, this statement probably means that prospective consumers or retailers relied on
the trademark appearing on the cloth to signify the quality of the cloth, thereby alleviating the need to diligently inspect the goods to assure themselves of the quality of each
individual article.
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mark upon it without his [the senior user’s] privity;”33 and (3)”an
action upon the case was brought by him who bought the cloth, for
this deceit.”34 Also, as in the Popham’s abstract, the case was “adjudged maintainable.”35
Croke’s abstract of Southern v. How includes certain details of
the earlier clothier’s case which the Popham’s version did not provide. For example, a more definite picture of the plaintiff in that
case has emerged, to wit, that (1) he was a clothier from Gloucestershire, (2) he sold his goods beyond his locale—specifically in
London, (3) he had a considerable reputation for the quality of his
cloths, and (4) he used his mark to embody the good-will and fame
of his business.36 Another very interesting difference between
Croke’s version and that of Popham is that Croke’s report identifies the plaintiff as the purchaser of the infringing cloths, not the
senior user of the mark. This version of the unnamed clothier’s
case, therefore, found that consumers of infringing goods could
have an action for deceit against the infringer, although it is not
clear from Croke’s account whether the senior user of the mark
could likewise find relief at law.37 Unsurprisingly, the discrepancy
between the versions as to the identity of the plaintiff became the
most contentious aspect of the controversy surrounding Southern v.
How.38 Be that as it may, we know that Anglo-American trademark law certainly did not develop in accordance with Croke’s
version.39
33. Id. In other words, without authorization. This language may offer a slight hint
that it was commonplace for manufacturers of cloths to contract with others regarding the
use of their trademarks.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Allowing a purchaser of inferior merchandise an action for deceit against an infringer who uses a mark, known to convey a reputation of quality, seems to fit better
within the doctrine of the tort of deceit as developed by the seventeenth century. In such
a case, the trademark could be viewed as serving as an acceptable type of warranty and
there would be privity between the infringer and the purchaser. See supra note 27 (discussing cases requiring the existence of a warranty and privity in cases involving deceit).
38. See GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; see also SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 810.
39. See generally Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 170
U.S.P.Q. 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (holding that consumers have
no standing to bring an action for trademark infringement); GILSON, supra note 4, §

STOLTE.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:44 PM

AN ANSWER TO SCHECHTER'S CONNUNDRUM

515

The last two abstracts of Southern v. How appeared in Rolle’s
Reports, which was published in 1676. The two reports are not
consistent. The first of the two abstracts agrees with Popham’s
version, which stated that Southern v. How was heard in 1618, but
like the abstract published in J. Bridgeman’s Reports, this report
fails to mention Judge Dodderidge’s dictum about the earlier clothier’s case.40 The second Rolle’s abstract, however, assigns the date
of Southern v. How as 1619,41 and does in fact refer to Dodderidge’s comments on the earlier case.42
As reported in the second Rolle’s abstract, Justice Dodderidge
referred to a case in the Court of Common Pleas involving “a
clothier of Gloucester [who] made cloths which were more expensive and more saleable than the cloths of any other, and he put a
special mark on them which no other clothier had before that.”43
Subsequently, “[another] clothier had counterfeited said mark and
placed it on his cloths, which were not as good but which he sold
at the same price as the other by this deceit.”44 The second Rolle’s
abstract concluded, likewise to the abstracts in Popham’s and
Croke’s, that an action “was deemed . . . against” the defendant “in
this case,” but, unlike the Popham’s and Croke’s abstracts, Judge
Dodderidge “did not say by which of the two the action was
1.01[1] (noting that courts have not yet recognized a consumer’s action for trademark
infringement). Gilson states that the idea of permitting consumers to sue for trademark
infringement is “a concept so advanced that even today in the age of consumerism the
courts have not yet come to recognize it.” GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1].
40. Southern v. How, 2 Rolle’s Reports 5, 81 Eng. Rep. 621.
41. This abstract indicates that the case was heard during the Trinity Term, “16 Jac.
I,” that is, during the sixteenth year of the reign of James I.
42. Southern v. How, 2 Rolle’s Reports 26, 81 Eng. Rep. 635. According to the
second abstract in Rolle’s Reports:
Justice Dod[d]eridge in 23 Eliz. in the [Court of] Common Pleas; the case was
that a clothier of Gloucester made cloths which were more expensive and more
saleable than the cloths of any other, and he put a special mark on them which
no other clothier had before that; and after a [another] clothier had counterfeited said mark and placed it on his cloths, which were not as good but which
he sold at the same price as the other by this deceit; [it] was deemed that the action was against him in this case, but Mr. Justice Dod[d]eridge did not say by
which of the two the action was brought, i.e. by the clothier who first had the
mark, or by the purchaser, although it seems to have been by the purchaser.
Id. This abstract reports that the earlier case was heard in 1581.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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brought, i.e., by the clothier who first had the mark, or by the purchaser, although it seems to have been by the purchaser.”45
The second Rolle’s abstract points to two further aspects of the
senior trademark user: (1) his cloths were reputed to be the most
expensive and famous in the region, and (2) he apparently had the
exclusive use of his mark as applied to cloths. That report also
suggests that the defendant passed-off his inferior infringing cloths
at the same price as the senior user’s cloths. It seems clear that
Rolle was familiar with the previously reported abstracts because
he specifically highlighted the discrepancy between the report in
Popham and the abstract in Croke’s on the issue of who the plaintiff was.46 Rolle awkwardly posited that Dodderidge failed to indicate whether the plaintiff in the earlier case was the senior trademark user or a duped purchaser, although he proffered his own
opinion that it was the purchaser.47
As demonstrated above, the five extant abstracts of Southern v.
How are rife with inconsistencies. Despite the conflicting reports,
the case has been universally cited as the foundation for the development of the Anglo-American law of trademarks and unfair competition.48 In response, Frank Schechter and other commentators
have pointed out that the conflicting accounts of Southern v. How
render the case an enfeebled and worthless precedent on which to

45. Id.
46. The publication of Rolle’s Reports was pre-dated by Popham’s Reports by 20
years and Croke’s Reports by 15 years.
47. Rolle may have favored Croke’s view that the purchaser was the plaintiff because such a view would fit better within the action for deceit as developed by 1676. See
supra notes 27, 28, 37 (discussing the general requirements of a warranty and privity between the parties for an action in deceit to lie).
48. See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9. Schechter, who apparently had grave
misgivings about assigning an important historical role to Southern v. How because of the
mass of inconsistencies appearing between the five different reports, lamented:
Despite the fact that Dodderidge’s reminiscence,—whatever it was—was pure
dictum, and despite the conflict of evidence as to what the dictum was, Southern v. How appears to have acquired considerable weight as authority for the
proposition that the unauthorized use of a trade-mark is unlawful and may be
the subject of an action in deceit.
Id. Schechter added that “[t]he English Courts have unequivocally relied upon the authority in Southern v. How to establish the antiquity of their jurisdiction to prevent trademark piracy.” Id.
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lay the foundation of trademark law.49
B. The Historical Treatment of Southern v. How By Courts
and Legal Scholars
The earliest court decisions bearing on the law of trademarks
and unfair competition make copious references to Southern v.
How as primary authority to grant legal and equitable relief for an
infringer’s misappropriation of another’s trade identity.50 The case
of Blanchard v. Hill,51 the first case to cite Southern v. How, is
generally regarded as the second English case on trademarks to be
reported.52 That case, dated 1742, involved a suit for an injunction
by a playing card merchant against another for use of the mark
“GREAT MOGUL” on playing cards.53
In denying the injunction, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke declared, “I do not know of any instance of granting an injunction
here, to restrain one trader from using the same mark with another;
and I think it would be of mischievous consequence to do it.”54
The plaintiff’s attorney, in support of the injunction, cited the unnamed reference in Southern v. How, to which the Lord Chancellor
49. Id. at 8-9; see infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussing the hostility
by some commentators to Southern v. How).
50. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9-12 (discussing nineteenth century English
cases declaring that Southern v. How is the starting point for the law of trademarks).
51. 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (Ch. 1742).
52. Id. The case was dismissed by a court of equity for lack of jurisdiction.
53. Id. at 693. The senior user of the mark claimed a privilege of monopoly to the
use of the mark by virtue of the grant of a royal charter bestowed during the seventeenth
century upon his company, which apparently provided for the exclusive use of the
“GREAT MOGUL” mark on playing cards. Id. Although Lord Chancellor Hardwicke
found that the charter was valid insofar as the creation of the company, he emphatically
denied that a royal grant of monopoly to a trademark was legal. Id.
54. Id. Some commentators suggest that Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s denial of an
injunction demonstrated that an action for trademark infringement was essentially legal
during this early period and not susceptible to the courts of equity. See, e.g., Gary M.
Ropski, The Federal Trademark Jury Trial—Awakening of a Dormant Constitutional
Right, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 177, 179-80 (1980). Such a claim overstates the significance
of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s comments. By the time that Blanchard v. Hill was
heard, the courts, both legal and chancery, became quite hostile to any past monopolies
granted by the monarchy and not granted by a statute of Parliament. See Motte v. Bennett, 17 F. Cas. 909, 913-14 (D.S.C. 1849) (discussing the hostility in the English courts
of equity to any royal grants of monopoly rights). In some senses, Blanchard v. Hill is as
much a political decision as one based on the principles of equity.
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Hardwicke commented, “[b]ut it was not the single act of making
use of the mark that was sufficient to maintain the action, but doing it with a fraudulent design, to put off bad cloths by this means,
or to draw away customers from the other clothier.”55 By thus distinguishing the circumstances of the unnamed case discussed in
Dodderidge’s dictum in Southern v. How from the facts of Blanchard v. Hill, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke suggested that had the defendant playing card merchant used the “GREAT MOGUL” mark
to pass off his cards as those of the plaintiff, then an action at law,
if not in equity, could indeed lie.56 If this is the case, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke recognized Southern v. How as valid precedent
for an action of unfair competition.
The third reported action for trademark infringement, Singleton
v. Bolton,57 was heard in 1783. Although the abstract does not
mention Southern v. How, Lord Mansfield stated that “if the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiff’s name
or mark, that would be a fraud for which an action would lie.”58
The next six English cases bearing on the law of trademarks or unfair competition seem to display a judicial ambivalence to the
value of Southern v. How; most fail to cite it at all, and the two that
do reference the case cite it in passing and attach no significance to
it.59
By the 1840s, the courts in both Great Britain and the United
States, finding a need to establish “the antiquity of their jurisdiction to prevent trade-mark piracy,”60 began paying homage to
Southern v. How as the foundation for granting relief against
55. Blanchard, 26 Eng. Rep. at 693.
56. See D.M. KERLY, LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 2 (T.A. Blanco
White & Robin Jacobs eds., 12th ed. 1986).
57. 99 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1783).
58. Id. (footnote omitted).
59. See Blofeld v. Payne, 110 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1833) (failing to mention Southern v. How); Sykes v. Sykes, 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B. 1824) (failing to mention Southern
v. How); Seddon v. Senate, 104 Eng. Rep. 290 (K.B. 1810) (failing to mention Southern
v. How); Motley v. Downman, 40 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch. 1837) (citing and providing details
of Southern v. How); Canham v. Jones, 35 Eng. Rep. 302 (Ch. 1813) (declaring the argument made by the defendant’s attorney that Southern v. How requires that the infringing goods be inferior and not merely bear a spurious mark); Hogg v. Kirby, 32 Eng. Rep.
336 (Ch. 1803) (failing to mention Southern v. How).
60. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9.
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trademark infringement or unfair competition.61 During the twentieth century, the courts continued to cite Southern v. How as the
starting point of common law recognition of trademark rights.62
Even in the 1990s, judicial recognition of Southern v. How as the
foundation for Anglo-American trademark rights apparently still
has significant impetus.63
61. See Fowle v. Spear, 9 F. Cas. 611, 612 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1847) (No. 4,996); Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 744, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 13,785); Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784) (Storey, J.); Clinton Metallic
Paint Co. v. New York Metallic Paint Co., 50 N.Y.S. 437, 442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1898) (declaring that the common law of trademark infringement dates back “as early as 1590” to
the Southern v. How case, as reported in Popham’s Reports); Crawshay v. Thompson,
134 Eng. Rep. 146, 157-58 (C.P. 1842); Hall v. Barrows, 32 L.J.K.B. 548, 551 (Ch.
1863) (stating that “[i]t was established as early as Popham’s Reports that an action at
law would lie for the piracy of a trade-mark”); Burgess v. Burgess, 43 Eng. Rep. 351, 353
(Ch. 1853) (declaring that the “law on the subject [of trademark infringement] is as old as
Southern v. How in Popham’s Reports”); Hirst v. Denham, 14 L.R.-Eq. 542, 549 (M.R.
1872). Some attorneys during this period thought the case could be used in fields beyond
mere trademark law. In 1839, the plaintiff in a case involving the fraudulent sale of a
human slave in Washington, D.C., apparently found something in Southern v. How to
support his argument that the buyer of the slave deceived the plaintiff into under-pricing
the slave. See Fenwick v. Grimes, 8 F. Cas. 1144, 1145 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 4,734).
62. See Magnolia Metal Co. v. Tandem Smelting Synd., Ltd., 17 R.P.C. 477, 483-84
(1900). In this case, Lord Halsbury, citing Southern v. How, waxes poetic, if somewhat
ineloquently, on the antiquity of the British common law of trademarks stating:
[T]hat cause of action is, as I have said, a very old and a familiar one . . . . Going back, therefore, as far as the reign of Elizabeth the form of action which the
Statement of Claim adopts has undoubtedly been a form of action in which if
the right of a man to have the reputation of selling that which is his manufacture as his manufacture, the right to prevent other people [from] fraudulently
stating that it is their manufacture when it is not—if that right is infringed there
is a remedy. That has, as I have said, ever since the reign of Elizabeth, been established in our Courts as being a right of action upon which anybody may sue
who has a ground for doing so.
Id. at 484; see also Stephano Bros., Inc. v. Stamatopoulos, 238 F. 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1916)
(“The right to an exclusive trade-mark is not one created by act of Congress. It is a right
which the common-law courts recognized at an early day.” (citing Southern v. How, Popham’s Reports 143 (1582))); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 520 F. Supp.
395, 397 (D. Utah 1981) (citing Southern v. How to establish the root of the common law
prohibition against passing-off).
63. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 354 n.1
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Judge Rader stated:
In this earliest reference to trademarks in the King’s courts, the Judge sustained
the action of a high-quality clothier against a maker of ill-made cloth who affixed the mark of the high-grade clothier to inferior products. This early case
illustrates that trademarks function as guarantors of quality, suppliers of infor-
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Although some trademark scholars have slavishly followed the
view of the courts that Southern v. How has significant value in establishing the earliest common law of trademarks and unfair competition,64 others have merely cited the case as a potential starting
point for the law.65 Still other scholars have been even more ambivalent about the import of the case and have been skeptical to assigning it much value at all. The most hostile treatment of the case
comes from Frank Schechter’s book The Historical Foundations of
the Law Relating to Trade-Marks,66 which, after almost seventyfive years, remains the most comprehensive and reliable source on
the subject. Assigning the case to the trash bin of irrelevancy,
Schechter devoted more than seven pages of his book to discredit-

mation to consumers seeking a reliable source of products, insurers of proper
allocation of reward to investors in the good will and reputation of a trade
name, in short, preservers of property rights and responsibilities.
Id. It is unlikely that anyone anticipated in 1618, when Southern v. How was heard, that
Judge Dodderidge’s dictum could amount to so much. The musical group New Kids on
the Block would probably hope that the case provided even greater scope than that accorded to it by Judge Rader. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Southern v. How and stating that “[t]he law
has protected trademarks since the early seventeenth century, and the primary focus of
trademark law has been misappropriation—the problem of one producer’s placing his
rival’s mark on his own goods”). Unfortunately for the New Kids on the Block, the
courts have never declared Southern v. How to prohibit non-trademark use of someone
else’s mark. Id.
64. See HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 12-13; Kenneth R. Pierce, The Trademark Law
Revision Act: Origins of the Use Requirement and an Overview of the New Federal
Trademark Law, 64 FLA. B.J. 35, 36 (1990); Kenneth L. Port, Foreword to Symposium on
Intellectual Property Law Theory, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 595 (1993) (erroneously
stating that the judgment of the unnamed case cited by Judge Dodderidge in Southern v.
How was decided in the defendant’s favor); Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 522 (1993) (repeating the same error); Andrew Ruff, Comment, Releasing the Grays: In Support of Legalizing Parallel Imports,
11 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 119, 129 n.66 (1992).
65. See GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 5:2;
BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 2 (2d ed.
1994); EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 34 (1914);
Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Developments of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP.
265, 287 n.63 (1975); James M. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringement Under the Lanham Act, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 458, 460 n.7 (1982); Rembert MeyerRochow, Passing Off—Past, Present and Future, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 38 (1994); Beverly W. Pattishall, The Constitutional Foundations of American Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 456, 457 (1988); Ropski, supra note 54, at 179.
66. SCHECHTER, supra note 1.
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ing Southern v. How as a reliable foundation of Anglo-American
trademark law.67 He emphatically stated that “the sole contribution
of that case was at best an irrelevant dictum of a reminiscent
judge . . . .”68
Much of Schechter’s hostility to the level of authority Southern
v. How has traditionally enjoyed is apparently the result of his frustration with the inconsistencies of the five accounts of the case.69
Schechter summarized “the remarkable discrepancies occurring in
the reports of this case” in four points. First, Schechter noted that
“[t]hree of the five reports contain no reference whatsoever to the
clothier’s case in Elizabeth[‘s reign].”70 Second, of those three reports, although the Popham’s abstract “definitely states the action
to have been by the clothier whose mark had been infringed,”
Schechter highlighted that the Croke’s abstract “is equally definite
that the action was by the defrauded purchaser,” and the second
Rolle’s abstract, “while not perhaps so positive in this regard, like-

67. Id. at 9-12, 123-26. Other commentators have agreed with this analysis. See
DUNCAN MACKENZIE KERLY, KERLY’S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 2 (7th
ed. 1951); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademark’s—Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP.
551, 562-63 (1969) (closely following Schechter’s analysis of the case); Edward S.
Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L.R. 29 (1910), reprinted in 62 TRADEMARK REP. 239, 251 n.30 (1972).
68. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 123.
69. Id. at 9-10, 123. In regard to the inconsistencies between the five accounts of
Southern v. How, Schechter stated:
To sum up the remarkable discrepancies occurring in the reports of this case:
(1) Three of the five reports contain no reference whatsoever to the clothier’s
case in Elizabeth[‘s reign]. (2) Of these three reports only one (Popham) definitely states the action to have been by the clothier whose mark had been infringed. Of the two others, one (Croke) is equally definite that the action was
by the defrauded purchaser, and the other (2 Rolle 26), while not perhaps so
positive in this regard, like-wise believes that the action was made by the
vendee. (3) Popham reports Dodderidge to have remembered that the clothier’s
action occurred in 22 Elizabeth, 2 Rolle says 23 Elizabeth, while Croke’s report
states 33 Elizabeth. (4) Only two of the five reports (Popham and 2 Rolle 5)
agree that Southern v. How was decided in 15 Jac. I, the other three reports giving other and different dates for the decision.
Id. at 8-9.
70. Id. Only two abstracts of the case fail to mention Dodderidge’s dictum of the
earlier unnamed clothier’s case. See supra notes 19-47 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the five accounts of the case). It is fairly clear from this passage that
Schechter meant to say that only three of the cases did mention the earlier case.
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wise believes that the action was made by the vendee.”71 Third,
Schechter took offense to the discrepancies between the timing of
the action, that is, whether “the clothier’s action occurred in 22
Elizabeth, . . . 23 Elizabeth, . . . [or] 33 Elizabeth.”72 Finally,
Schechter observed that “[o]nly two of the five reports (Popham
and 2 Rolle 5) agree that Southern v. How was decided in 15 Jac. I,
the other three reports giving . . . different dates for the decision.”73
Although Schechter’s frustration is justified, it is far from clear
why he devoted so much effort to dislodge the case from its precedential pedestal. Because the three versions of Southern v. How
only included a very brief, ambiguous account of the earlier unnamed action, the case could not help being what Schechter called
“a most fragile link between the Middle Ages and the modern
commercial law of trade-marks.” Discrediting Southern v. How
could not change this fact. True to his progressive nature, however, Schechter ended his treatment of Southern v. How on a positive, hopeful note.74 Referring to the missing bridge between the
guild jurisprudence of trademark law75 and common law protection, Schechter predicted that “[f]urther researches into the history
of the clothier’s case mentioned in Southern v. How on the one
hand, and into the contemporaneous activity of the councilor courts
in the protection of trade-marks on the other, may possibly ultimately furnish a satisfactory solution of our problem.”76
Research during the late 1970s and early 1980s did exactly
what Schechter had anticipated. Like a phoenix, rising out of some
“moldering mass of unpublished records of the common law” the
71. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 8-9.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 123. Schechter appeared sincere in stating that he hoped that the unnamed
clothier’s case made reference to by Judge Dodderidge in Southern v. How would be unearthed sometime in the future. Along these lines, Schechter stated that:
It is possible that some day in some moldering mass of unpublished records of
the common law may be found a report of a case in the reign of Elizabeth by a
clothier for infringement of his trade-mark that will justify the authority with
which Southern v. How has been so unanimously endowed.
Id.
75. See id. at 38-77 (discussing the use and protection of marks within individual
guilds during early English history).
76. Id. at 126.
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case of Sandforth slipped into the hands of an enterprising legal
history scholar who translated the documents and published them
for posterity. Frank Schechter, in the end, shall have his way.
Southern v. How finally can be supplanted in the annals of trademark law by the case to which it so ambiguously referred: Sandforth’s Case.
II. INTRODUCING SANDFORTH’S CASE: THE FIRST REPORTED
TRADEMARK CASE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
This Article embodies the first comprehensive analysis of the
“lost” case that Judge Dodderidge referred to in Southern v. How.
No English or American court has ever cited to it and the case has
been ignored altogether by the mass of textbooks, treatises, law review articles, and other scholarly works in the field of trademark
and unfair competition law. The emergence of Sandforth’s Case
raises questions as to why the case lay dormant from 1584 to the
late 1970s and, more strikingly, why courts and trademark scholars
have generally failed to take notice of the discovery of this true
foundation of Anglo-American trademark law.
A. Explaining the Dormancy of Sandforth’s Case
In 1972, the British Legal History Conference (“Conference”)
was held at Aberystwyth, in Wales, to discuss the problems and
progress in the scholarship of British legal history.77 Since then
the Conference has met at least twelve times and has generated a
number of valuable collections of essays devoted to the mysteries
of the history of the law in Great Britain.78 Many of those essays
77. See LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN ix. (Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995) (reporting the
proceedings of the British Legal History Conference). The British Legal History Conference (“Conference”) has become the pre-eminent forum of discussion of all aspects of the
history of British law. Id.
78. In addition to Law Reporting in Britain, supra note 77, the Conference has generated many other proceedings. See, e.g., THE LIFE OF THE LAW (Peter Birks ed. 1993)
(prepared by the Conference); LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MAKING (W.M. Gordon & T.D.
Fergus eds., 1991) (same); LEGAL RECORD AND HISTORICAL REALITY (Thomas G. Watkin
ed. 1989) (same); THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF LAW (Richard Eales & David Sullivan
eds., 1987) (same); CUSTOMS, COURTS AND COUNSEL (A. Kiralfy et al. eds. 1985) (same);
LAW, LITIGANTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (E.W. Ives & A.H. Manchester eds., 1983)
(same); LEGAL RECORD AND THE HISTORIAN (J.H. Baker ed. 1978) (same); LEGAL
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are designed to introduce the modern legal practitioner and scholar
to the earliest law reports and their importance in the development
of statutory and common law over twelve centuries. Unfortunately, early English law case-reporting deficiencies, particularly
during the Elizabethan period, have had a significant impact on
“lost” cases, such as Sandforth’s Case.
1. The General Problem of Reporting Early Case Law
The most significant difficulty facing British legal historians is
the sheer volume of unpublished accounts of early case law.79 A
significant amount of early legal history has never been printed and
lacks an exhaustive catalogue of sources.80 The next nagging
problem is the discovery and collection of early reports that do exist in a plethora of institutions and private collections.81
Although the great libraries, archives, and other institutions

HISTORY STUDIES (D. Jenkins ed. 1975) (same).
79. See PERCY H. WINFIELD, THE CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 23
(1925). Professor Winfield was one of the most respected legal historians of this century
and his volume remains one of the best, most readable texts on early British law reporting. The first efforts in this area of scholarship were made between 1863 and 1879 by
Alfred John Horwood who translated and published five volumes of case reports during
the reign of Edward I. See Paul Brand, The Beginnings of English Law Reporting, in
LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 1 (Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995). Shortly afterwards, the Selden Society was formed and began publishing translations of previously unpublished
primary source materials. From the 1880s until the present, the Selden Society has presented posterity with over 100 massive volumes incorporating tens of thousands of MSS
(primary legal accounts by the earliest law reporters) occupying over 100,000 pages.
Many of the early cases cited in this Article were obtained from the Selden Society series,
the author having perused the indices of all available volumes for relevant case materials.
Despite the present availability of thousands of early case reports, an untold quantity have
yet to be discovered, translated, and published. See WINFIELD, supra, at 23-30; Brand,
supra, at 1.
80. The author of the present Article can personally attest that, even 70 years after
Winfield lamented the absence of useful indices, the Seldon Society has unfortunately
failed to provide a comprehensive index of the sources published in its hundred-plus series of volumes.
81. See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 23-26. Although the great British universities,
namely, Oxford, Cambridge, Cantabury, etc., the British Library, the Inns of Court, and
national archives hold much of the known MSS (primary legal accounts by the earliest
law reporters), it is currently impossible to estimate the number of early sources that are
in the possession of local institutions, ancient private library collections, which exist in
large part in the manor houses of Great Britain, and foreign entities. See id. at 24.
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probably have improved the organization and accessibility of the
earliest legal records in their possession, problems still exist. Difficulties remain regarding the competent translation of legal materials.82 Also of great significance are the issues associated with
prioritizing the treatment of the tremendous number of unpublished
materials known to exist.83 Finally, injudicious editing of early reports over the past 150 years also has taken its toll on the legal history available. For example, Professor Baker, who discovered and
translated Sandforth’s Case, has criticized some editors for such
unintended censorship, stating, “Unconscious censorship by printers and editors, including even Selden Society editors, has kept
[some primary case reports] largely from sight.”84 Baker presumed
that reports “seemed superfluous to the Year Books, as later understood, and so they were treated as if they were not there.”85

82. See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 7-13 (discussing the language problems posed
by many of the early case reports).
83. Indeed, significant problems are posed by the frequent discovery of what purports to be the same case accounts published in volumes of vastly different dates and containing varying content. Already we have seen how the five different treatments of
Southern v. How created confusion that lasted 350 years. The severe difficulty, and resulting frustration, of getting to the core of a particular series of case reports has plagued
even the most respected and competent of British legal historians. See J.H. Baker, Some
Early Newgate Reports (1315-28), in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 35 (Chantal Stebbings
ed. 1995). Using wit to conceal his frustration, Professor Baker, who incidentally is the
discoverer and translator of Sandforth’s Case, explained as follows:
I should like to dedicate this essay to the Goddess Serendipitas, who has invisibly regulated so much of my research in manuscript law reports. Twenty years
ago I published a series of Newgate reports from 1616, which I had recently
stumbled upon at Harvard, thinking they were the earliest of their kind. Sometime later, I found in the same remarkable Treasure Room a much shorter series
of two centuries older, from 1421. I thought these were unprinted until I acquired a copy of the very rare Year Book of 9-10 Henry V published privately
by Rogers in 1948; they are printed there, but I suspect they are still not widely
known. More recently, while searching through manuscript Year Books in the
British Library, looking for moots, I found several series from the reign of Edward II and the first year of Edward III. These, I hope and believe, are not
known at all. It was quite a startling find for me, because the cases are three
hundred years earlier than I began with.
Id.
84. Id. at 35.
85. Id.
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2. Law Reporting During the Elizabethan Era
Sandforth’s Case was heard during the middle of Queen Elizabeth’s reign. It is true that the English common law had developed
considerably during the six hundred years before Elizabeth ascended the throne in 1558. Nevertheless, the record of the law thus
developed created what one scholar termed “something of a crisis”
by the 1590s.86 Much of the early British legal record was collected in a series of volumes called the Year Books.87 One scholar,
Percy Winfield,88 suggests that the Year Books began coverage by
1270.89 Although far from complete in their present form, those
Year Books provide an indispensable chronicle of British case law
for more than 250 years. The Year Books suddenly ceased, however, in 1535—twenty-three years before Elizabeth became monarch.90 Ten years after the demise of the Year Books, the thirteen
86. David Ibbetson, Law Reporting in the 1590s, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 73
(Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995). Demonstrating the difficulties faced by Elizabethan lawyers and judges, Ibbetson explains:
From the point of view of those studying law, there were hardly any didactic
treatises; apart from Littleton’s Tenures, already well over a century old, and
St. Germain’s discursive Doctor and Student, the few texts which did exist
were little more than collections of relevant statutes and cases. There had been
no attempt to reduce the law to anything like order, so that even the bestequipped student might be well advised simply to digest anything he had read
under alphabetical headings, in the hope that genuine understanding might flow
from this garnering of information.
Id.
87. The Year Books basically incorporate abstracts and reports of varying completeness and scope of most law cases heard during each year of the reign of the sitting
monarch. See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 158-75 (discussing the apparent purposes and
uses of the Year Books). According to Winfield:
On the whole, the contents of the Year-Books are of an intensely practical
character. They take us into the law courts and keep us there. They do not impart elementary instruction, they tell us practically nothing of the theoretical
foundations of the law. They record all procedural moves made in an action,
and they assume a complete familiarity with the procedure on the part of the
men likely to use them.
Id. at 161.
88. See Winfield, supra note79
89. Id. at 158-59.
90. See id. at 171. Ibbetson states that, even until close to the sixteenth century, the
Year Books had been published; but after 1535, they ceased to include any new case reports. Ibbetson, supra note 86, at 74. There was apparently a half-hearted, and ultimately unsuccessful, effort made to rejuvenate publication of the Year Books in 1679.
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judges of the realm apparently lamented the void in legal reporting
caused thereby.91
While the Year Books disappeared during the early sixteenth
century, a series of case reports emerged and continued until the
nineteenth century.92 Typically, they were compiled and made
available by individual legal practitioners and scholars.93 Although they emerged during the sixteenth century, it was not until
the seventeenth century that these new types of published case reports were able to satisfactorily replace the Year Books. Records
and abstracts of law cases continued to be written in manuscript
form, but not many were published in the new reporters until after
the sixteenth century.94 Only two volumes of reports were generated during the period between 1535 and 1590.
It is certainly not a foregone conclusion that Sandforth’s Case
would have been brought to light and used by succeeding generations had the Year Books continued to incorporate contemporaneous case reports until the end of the sixteenth century. But it can
be said accurately that the decline of the Year Books fifty years before the case was heard and the paucity of the new type of case reporters in the intervening period assuredly consigned Sandforth’s
Case to oblivion for 420 years. Thus, in Southern v. How, Judge
Dodderidge had no other alternative but to rely on his imperfect
memory to invoke Sandforth’s Case thirty-four years after it was
See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 171; 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 164-78 (J.H.
Baker ed. 1977) [hereinafter SPELMAN REPORTS].
91. See JOHN W. WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 78 n.2 (4th ed. 1882).
92. See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 171-72 (ascribing the substitution of those series of case reports for the Year Books to the former’s superior reporting and treatment of
the cases heard by the courts during the mid-sixteenth century).
93. See id.
94. See Ibbetson, supra note 86, at 73-79. According to Ibbetson:
While the old Year Books continued to be produced in many editions during
the rest of the century, there was very little modern material in print. Plowden’s Commentaries had appeared in 1571 and Dyer’s Reports in 1585, but although these were welcome additions to the canon they merely scratched the
surface. The absence of recent case reports must—at the least—have inconvenienced practitioners who would have been forced to place greater reliance on
the fickleness of memory.
Id. at 73. Winfield suggests that reliance on memory in recalling precedent was paramount even during the Year Book period because the Year Books’ versions of cases suffered varying degrees of inconsistency. See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 149-50.
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decided.
3. A Problem in Modern Legal Scholarship
Although it is easy to understand how Sandforth’s Case was
lost for more than 400 years, it is more difficult to explain why the
case continued to slumber twenty years after it was first discovered
and identified. The first published reference to the case occurred
in 1979 in J.H. Baker’s survey text, An Introduction to English Legal History.95 Professor Baker, while citing the case, provided no
translation and only a scant detail of the abstract.96 There was no
further reference to the case until Baker, together with S.F.C. Milsom, published their Sources of English Legal History—Private
Law to 175097 seven years after Baker’s prior book.
In that second book, Baker provided a complete translation of
three documents that report Sandforth’s Case. In a footnote he
once again identified the case as the one referred to in Southern v.
How.98 Since 1986, however, when the second book was published, only one reference has been made to the case, and even that
reference was relegated to a law review footnote.99 To explain the
silence surrounding Sandforth’s Case for almost twenty years since
its discovery, this Essay suggests that trademark scholars do not
ordinarily peruse books on general British legal history to find
support for their own literary enterprises. Moreover, as one law
student once mused, trademark scholars do not possess the motivation to scour law review footnotes.100
95. ENGLISH HISTORY I, supra note 2, at 385 n.45. Professor Baker identified the
case as the same one cited in Southern v. How and recognized the case to be the first account involving trademark infringement and unfair competition. Id.
96. Id.
97. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615-18.
98. Id. at 617 n.18.
99. See Timothy H. Hiebert, Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation: Duality and Universality in Nineteenth Century Trademark Law, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 483,
492 n.45 (1990). Although Hiebert recognized that, as of 1990, “trademark historians
generally have been unaware of [Baker’s] significant discovery,” he himself was not inclined to call much attention to that discovery. See id. While somewhat dismayed by
Hiebert’s reticence, the present author heartily thanks him for it.
100. See Phil Nichols, Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals: In Response to Professor Roger Cramton, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1122, 1131 (1987) (confessing that
“a common joke among law review editors is that no one reads footnotes anyway”).
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B. The Text of Sandforth’s Case
In his publication of the case, Professor Baker includes three
extant reports that he discovered in manuscript form. He also referred to two additional manuscripts, which he did not furnish, that
cite or explain the case.101 Of the three documents provided by
Baker, one appears to be what is considered a complaint in the
United States or a statement of claim in Great Britain and Canada.102 The two other documents are abstracts of the trial.
1. The Sandforth Complaint
The complaint is important in the history of trademark law.103
It states that the plaintiff in Sandford’s Case was a “clothier” who
for twelve years, manufactured “woollen cloths called Reading
kerseys, ‘halfes’ cloths and Bridgewaters,”104 which “were good
and substantial without any fraud or deception in that behalf . . . .”105 The complaint further stated that the plaintiff “was
accustomed to mark such cloths with the letters ‘J.G.’ and with a
sign called a tucker’s handle . . . .”106 According to the complaint,

101. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615 n.13. Baker cites a case entitled
Samforde, CUL MS. Ii 5. 38, fo. 132, and another entitled Sandforth’s Case, HLS MS.
2074, fo. 84v. Since publication of his 1986 book, Professor Baker has discovered yet
another brief reference to the case in BL MS. Lansdowne 1086, fo. 74v. This last reference apparently indicates that the action was heard during the Easter term, 1585, rather
than in 1584, the year other sources give.
102. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615-17 (citing Cory’s Entries, BL MS.
Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. (British Library) (1584)).
103. Although the complaint in Sandforth’s Case is lengthy, its importance to
trademark law makes it worthy of review. See Appendix, infra pp. 545-47 for the full
text of the complaint.
104. Id. at 615. A “kersey” is defined as a “coarse ribbed woolen cloth for hose and
work clothes woven first in medieval England.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L
DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 1238. The author could not locate an appropriate definition for the two other types of garments or cloths.
105. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615.
106. Id. at 616. The author could find no definition for a “tucker’s handle.” Nevertheless, potentially relevant definitions for “tucker” are (1) “an attachment on a sewing
machine for making tucks,” and (2) “a piece of lace or cloth used to fill in the low neck
line of a dress.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 2460. The
latter definition asks to compare the word to the use in the phrase “bib and tucker.” Id.
Most likely, the noun “tuck,” as identified in the first definition of “tucker,” refers to “a
fold stitched or woven into cloth for the purpose of shortening, decorating or controlling
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the plaintiff sold the same cloths at home and overseas.107
The complaint asserted that the plaintiffs customers had become “accustomed” to buying “those cloths well and substantially
made and from wool marked as above said,” by paying the same
for those “cloths as for good and substantial cloths . . . upon the affirmation of the same plaintiff and his servants and factors that the
same cloths were good and substantial, without any inspection or
contradiction of the same cloths . . . .”108 The complaint stated that
the plaintiff had “lawfully and honestly obtained and acquired
much gain and profit from the making and selling of such cloths,
for the further support and living of the same plaintiff and his
whole family.”109
The complaint alleged that the defendant willfully schemed and
plotted “to hinder the same plaintiff in selling such cloths of his
and to take away and worsen the opinion and esteem which the
aforesaid merchants and subjects had concerning the cloths of the
same plaintiff.”110 The complaint specifically alleged that, for two
years, the defendant “made various woollen cloths . . . which were
ill, insufficient and unmerchantable; and deceitfully marked the
same cloths with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and with the aforesaid

fullness.” Id. A “tucker’s handle” could have been a tool of a clothier’s trade. Also potentially relevant is that, during the Medieval and Renaissance periods, a “tuck” was a
slender sword or rapier. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1923 (3rd ed. 1992). It is possible that the device used as part of the plaintiff’s trademark
was the handle of a sword. The author leaves it to experts in the field of medieval languages to offer a reasonable semblance of what the plaintiff’s “tucker’s handle” mark
may have looked like.
107. The complaints states:
[T]he same plaintiff sold the same cloths, thus made and marked, through the
whole of the aforesaid time, at T. aforesaid and at C. in the aforesaid county
and in various other places within this realm of England, and likewise at M. in
Wales and in various other places in parts beyond the seas, as well to various
merchants and other subjects of this realm of England as to various other merchants and foreigners . . . .
BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 616.
108. Id. This seems to indicate that the plaintiff argued for the inherent “informational” value his mark had in relation to consumers. In this way, the plaintiff’s customers
did not need to spend time and effort inspecting the nature and quality of each cloth because the customers associated the plaintiff’s trademark with high quality goods.
109. Id.
110. Id. Thus, our first recorded infringer was allegedly willful.
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mark called a tucker’s handle; and exposed for sale the same
cloths . . . as the cloths of the same plaintiff.”111
As a result of the defendant’s actions, “various merchants and
other subjects who were buyers and had previously been accustomed to buy[ing] the same plaintiff’s cloths,” relying on the letters ‘J.G.’ and the tucker’s handle mark to identify the plaintiff’s
cloths, bought the defendant’s cloths after seeing the “cloths
marked with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and the aforesaid mark
called a tucker’s handle.”112 Those buyers, who bought the defendant’s cloths “without further inspection or contradiction of the
same cloths, as being good and substantial cloths such as the cloths
of the same plaintiff had used to be, and as being the same plaintiff’s cloths,” changed their opinion of the plaintiff’s cloths after
inspecting the cloths purchased from the defendant and finding that
the cloths were “deceitful, insufficient and unmerchantable, both in
length and width and in quality and substance of the same
cloths.”113 Those purchasers “not only completely reversed the
opinion and esteem which they had previously had of the same
cloths but also gave notice to many other merchants and subjects
of the deceitful and insufficient making of the aforesaid cloths.”114
Consequently, when the plaintiff attempted to sell “cloths of his
(marked in form aforesaid)” he was unable to sell those “cloths
(marked in form aforesaid) by reason of the deceit committed and
used by the aforesaid defendant as set out above.”115 Thus, the
plaintiff alleged that he was damaged because “the merchants and
subjects aforesaid who previously used to buy such cloths from the
same plaintiff refused to buy the same cloths from him by reason
of the aforesaid deceit.”116
Assuming that all allegations of the Sandforth’s complaint
were true, what modern trademark attorney would not welcome the
opportunity to prosecute a case with such a mass of advantageous

111. Id. This suggests that the defendant posed as the plaintiff when actually making sales, or stated that he was an agent of the plaintiff with authority to make sales.
112. Id. at 617.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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facts? The complaint furnishes all the perks that attorneys look for
in a trademark infringement and unfair competition suit: (1) wide
distribution of the plaintiff’s goods, (2) an apparently distinctive
trademark, (3) a long period of use of the mark, (4) considerable
fame in the mark (both in the plaintiff’s own region and in other
regions and abroad), (5) actual confusion, (6) the apparent availability of consumer witnesses that can attest to their confusion, (7)
proof of damages, (8) the unjust enrichment of the defendant, (9)
willful conduct on the defendant’s part, (10) passing off, (11) loss
of reputation and good will in the plaintiff’s business, and (12) finally a poor, honest, hard working small businessman whose family may have to sacrifice during the next winter on account of the
defendant’s egregious conduct. The facts as alleged in Sandforth’s
Case provide an almost perfect plaintiff’s case, incorporating more
useful nuggets than are generally found in modern pleadings.
The plaintiff’s attorney seems to have framed the issues and
facts in the complaint of Sandforth’s Case in a manner that is remarkably modern, albiet too reliant on the now-discarded word
“aforesaid” or its Latin counterpart. Can it be a mere coincidence
that a practitioner of the mid-Elizabethan age had the tools and
presence of mind to draft a complaint that, if the pleaded facts
were found to be true, would sail to a summary judgment, complete with a grant of increased damages, attorney’s fees and costs?
While this question calls for wild and unnecessary speculation, it
highlights the possibility that actions of the sort found in Sandforth’s Case may not have been uncommon during the sixteenth
century, and that the plaintiff’s attorney may have had doctrinal resources at hand to assist him in drafting his complaint. After all,
contemporaneous case reports during the reigns of Edward VI,
Mary, and Elizabeth were not collected and published in an appreciable degree, but were left to languish as unnoticed and long forgotten manuscripts, as Sandforth’s Case had been. In the meantime, we must simply encourage Professor Baker, his colleagues,
and their successors to keep digging among the massive body of
unpublished manuscripts for additional cases of this species.
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2. The Sandforth Decision
Now that we are aware of the pleaded facts of Sandforth’s
Case, we must turn to the two extant records of the court’s decision in the case. These abstracts are considerably less detailed than
the complaint. According to the text of the first abstract,117 the action was brought by “J.S.,”118 a clothier known for making “good
cloth” who used a mark, against “J.D.,”119 a different clothier
known for making “bad cloth” who used another mark.120 “J.S.
brought an action on the case against J.D.” because “J.D. set J.S.’s
mark on his [own cloth], and by means thereof obtained good
business (utterance).”121 At trial, “[J.D.’s] cloth was found . . . to
be bad, and by reason thereof J.S’s cloth was discredited and he
could not have as good business afterwards as he had before.”122
Chief Judge Anderson123 noted that “[i]t seems the action lies,
117. The text of the first abstract is as follows:
J.S., being a clothier who made good cloth, used a mark; and J.D., being also
a clothier but who made bad cloth, used another mark; then J.D. set J.S.’s mark
on his [own cloth], and by means thereof obtained good business (utterance);
but [J.D.’s] cloth was found upon trial to be bad, and by reason thereof J.S’s
cloth was discredited and he could not have as good business afterwards as he
had before. Upon all this matter J.S. brought an action on the case against J.D.
Anderson C.J. said it seems the action lies, because J.S. is damaged by J.D.
using his mark.
Peryam J. said there was no law against anyone using whatever mark he
wished; and when J.D. used the mark which J.S. used he did no wrong to J.S., it
being a lawful act. And even though J.S. was thereby damaged, he shall not
have an action on the case for it, because it is damnum absque injuria.
Anderson C.J. said if someone has a house he may lawfully burn it if he
wishes; but if by its being burned someone else’s house is burned, the latter
shall have an action on the case; and yet it was a lawful act.
Id. (citing the manuscript denoted as HLS MS. 2071, fo. 86).
118. There is a discrepancy between this abstract and the complaint. In the complaint, the plaintiff’s initials (and mark) are “J.G.,” but in the abstract, the initials are
“J.S.”
119. Based on the manuscripts, Baker identifies the defendant as some variation of
Samford, Sandforde, or Sandforth. Id. at 615 n.13. The text of this abstract identifies him
as “J.D.”
120. Id. at 617.
121. Id. The same term was used in the Popham version of Southern v. How.
122. Id.
123. The Chief Judge, Sir Edmund Anderson, was known to be a very independent
and efficient jurist. See A.L. ROWSE, THE ENGLAND OF ELIZABETH—THE STRUCTURE OF

STOLTE.TYP

534

9/29/2006 4:44 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 8:505

because J.S. is damaged by J.D. using his mark.”124 Judge Peryam,
however, disagreed, finding that “there was no law against anyone
using whatever mark he wished; and when J.D. used the mark
which J.S. used he did no wrong to J.S., it being a lawful act.”125
Peryam added that “even though J.S. was thereby damaged, he
shall not have an action on the case for it, because it is damnum
absque injuria.”126 Chief Judge Anderson responded by ruling that
“if someone has a house he may lawfully burn it if he wishes; but
if by its being burned someone else’s house is burned, the latter
shall have an action on the case; and yet it was a lawful act.”127
In this abstract of the case, the Chief Judge recognized the
damage sustained by the senior user and declared that relief is
available under the common law.128 Judge Peryam disagreed, stating that he was not aware of any action at law that would justify
relief, even if the plaintiff had been damaged.129 The most interesting aspect of the abstract, however, is Anderson’s analogous reply that the action constituted a trespass, regardless of whether the
defendant’s conduct had theretofore been assumed lawful. In other
words, a merchant may choose to apply any mark he wishes to his
SOCIETY 374 (1961). The English Historian, Professor A.L. Rowse characterized Anderson thus:
Anderson, C.J., who was of Scots descent, was a quick worker, but harsh and
brutal in manner . . . . [H]e had certain qualities of a great judge: he was even
more independent than Coke [the sixteenth century’s most famous jurist]; it
was he who stood up to Leicester over the Cavendish case and drew up the protest of the judges against arbitrary imprisonment. He came down strongly
against a Puritan mayor of Leicester for imprisoning a man for setting up maypoles: the Puritans considered this a pagan survival. One finds the judge’s action congenial. At the age of seventy-two, while on circuit in Somerville, confronted with a disturbance, he snatched a sword from a man-at-arms, laid about
him, and quelled it. A man of spirit, he gave judgement according to reason; if
he considered there was no reason in the old books, he threw them over.
Id.
124. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617.
125. Id.
126. Id. The term “damnum absque injuria” refers to an injury for which there is no
legal remedy. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990) (defining damnum absque injuria as a harm or loss “which does not give rise to an action for damages against
the person causing it”).
127. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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goods—that is his right—but once his choice of a mark results in
quantifiable damage to another merchant who had previously chosen and used the mark, the former’s choice becomes actionable.
Baker’s second abstract of Sandforth’s Case is much more interesting than the first report.130 The second abstract contains a
note by “Fletewoode,”131 stating “that an action on the case lies by
the custom of London for counterfeiting another’s mark.”132 The
second abstract also includes language that suggests that “Fenner”133 informed the court that “‘a clothier did give the mark of another clothier, but with a little difference hardly to be perceived,
and set that on bad and false cloths, whereby the cloths of the other

130. The second abstract of Sandforth’s Case reads as follows:
Note, by Fletewoode, that an action on the case lies by the custom of London
for counterfeiting another’s mark. And he put this case when the following
matter was moved by Fenner: ‘a clothier did give the mark of another clothier,
but with a little difference hardly to be perceived, and set that on bad and false
cloths, whereby the cloths of the other (which made good) were after discredited.’ And it was demanded whether an action on the case lay.
Anderson C.J. said it did.
Wyndham J. agreed, if the statute enacted that no clothier shall give the mark
of another.
Fletewoode. In 5 Mar. it was adjudged in one Longe’s case accordingly in
parliament, and the counterfeiter was [a member] of the house and for this reason was put out and paid the other 300 pounds.
Peryam and Mead JJ. said that anyone may give what mark he will, and it is
damnum absque injuria to the other; and deceit does not lie against him who
does a wholly lawful act for his own profit.
Id. at 617-18 (citing manuscript HLS MS. 5048, fo. 118v. (formerly HLS MS. Acc.
704755, fo. 118v.)).
131. Winfield identifies William Fletewoode as “at one time Recorder of London”
and the indexer of the Year Book series for the reigns of Edward V, Richard III, Henry
VII, and Henry VIII. WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 181. Fletewoode was also a member
of the Middle Temple and represented parties at court at least during the 1560s. See
BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 488 (presenting a case heard in 1565 at which Fletewoode acted as plaintiff’s counsel). In their index, Baker and Milsom also characterize
Fletewoode as acting as a Sargent of Law in Sandforth’s Case. As a Sargent of Law,
Fletewoode could have been present at the hearing and voiced his views without necessarily acting as either of the party’s counsel. Telephone Interview with J.H. Baker (Oct.
21, 1997).
132. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617-18.
133. Edward Fenner acted as counsel during the later part of the sixteenth century
and was later appointed as a justice to the King’s Bench sometime during the reign of
James I. He died in 1612.

STOLTE.TYP

536

9/29/2006 4:44 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 8:505

(which made good) were after discredited.’”134 Furthermore, “it
was demanded whether an action on the case lay.”135
As in the first abstract, Chief Judge Anderson “said it did.”136
Judge Wyndham “agreed, if the statute enacted that no clothier
shall give the mark of another.”137 Fletewoode informed the court
that, in “5 Mar.,”138 the matter “was adjudged in one Longe’s case
accordingly in parliament, and the counterfeiter was [a member] of
the house and for this reason was put out and paid the other 300
pounds.”139 Judges Peryam and Mead said, however, “that anyone
may give what mark he will, and it is damnum absque injuria to
the other; and deceit does not lie against him who does a wholly
lawful act for his own profit.”140
As the construction of the abstract is ambiguous, it is not entirely clear whether Fletewoode and Fenner represented the parties
in Sandforth’s case in opposition to each other, jointly represented
just the plaintiff, or acted as counsel at all. The language, “Note,
by Fletewoode,” might mean that the court was presented by a
written record penned by Fletewoode relating to an earlier trademark counterfeiting case heard in the House of Commons in 1558.
Perhaps the language indicates that Fletewoode authored the abstract itself or a previous version of it. Alternatively, and more
likely, the phrase should have read, “By Fletewoode, note that an
action on the case lies . . . .” If that is the correct interpretation,
then Fletewoode could have acted as counsel in the case. According to the gist of his comments, Fletewoode likely acted as plaintiff’s counsel; he cited an earlier precedent where an action for
trademark counterfeiting was recognized by the House of Commons.
On the other hand, if Fletewoode acted as defendants’ counsel,
134. Id. Baker indicates that the passage in internal quotation marks was originally
in English, indicating that the other portions of the abstract were either in Latin or
French. Id. at 618 n.19.
135. Id. at 618
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. During the fifth year of the reign of Mary: 1558.
139. Id. The best interpretation of this phrase is that the counterfeiter was expelled
from the House of Commons for his conduct and was forced to pay damages.
140. Id.
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his comments may be a badly edited effort at distinguishing the
facts in Sandforth from the earlier case. It would appear, by the
language of the abstract, that Fenner probably did act as counsel
for the plaintiff because the record states that he “moved” the matter in Sandforth. It also is possible that both Fletewoode and Fenner appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, and the silence of the defendant’s counsel could be explained away by a speculation that he
had nothing memorable to add to the proceeding. Finally, because
Fletewoode was a “sargent of law,” he simply could have been
present and pointed out the prior parliamentary action to the court
in his official position, without having represented either party.
The jewel, and inevitably a nagging annoyance, of this abstract
is the reference to Longe’s Case, an earlier case—reportedly heard
in parliament and not at the Queen’s Bench—involving trademark
infringement. That brief citation, if ever discovered and published,
could authoritatively push back the date of the earliest British
trademark law to 1558—prior to the reign of Elizabeth. Baker
states that no record exists in the Journal of the House of Commons for that year.141
Another interesting point is that Fletewoode characterized an
action for trademark counterfeiting as a “custom of London.”142
That characterization, which demonstrates that trademark infringement violated local London law at the time, together with the
141. Id. at 618 n.1.
142. A “custom” was a type of legal action heard by local or municipal courts, as
opposed to common law courts. Telephone Interview with Professor J.H. Baker (Oct. 21,
1997). Professor Baker indicated that Fletewoode, who had served as Recorder of London and would therefore have been quite knowledgeable about the actions that would lie
in a London municipal court, characterized the action in Sandforth’s Case as one which
would ordinarily lie in a London court. Id. Common law courts frequently adopted the
“customs” of important municipalities, such as London, and incorporated them into the
common law of the realm. Id.; see Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of the Ancient
Regime: Custom, Utility, and the Common Law of the Nineteenth Century, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 183, 185-201 (1993) (providing a thorough discussion of the history and importance of legal customs and their impact on the development of the English common law);
see also CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 85-88 (1927) (stating that “if a
custom is proved in an English Court by satisfactory evidence to exist and to be observed,
the function of the Court is merely to recognize the custom as operative law”). See generally Albert Kiralfy, Custom in Mediaeval English Law, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 26 (1988)
(discussing differences in customs based on geography, as well as the various customs in
specific areas of the law).
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fact that in Sandforth’s Case and possibly in an even earlier, preElizabethan parliamentary case, trademark infringement was actionable, would strengthen the contention that the origins of the
common law of trademarks should be securely assigned to the sixteenth century and not, as historically argued, the nineteenth.
III. THE IMPACT OF SANDFORTH’S CASE
Although the reports of Sandforth’s Case undoubtedly will
pose more questions than they answer, one question that should be
addressed now is whether the case represents the old action for the
tort of deceit or an entirely new type of action, theretofore unrecognized and uncategorized. Certainly, if the case was an action for
deceit, it is a hybrid. Ultimately, the answer to this question will
not detract from the newly established authority of Sandforth’s
Case as the first reported action for trademark infringement. But it
may support the argument that in Elizabethan England, the common law courts, responding to a quickly changing and expanding
mercantile economy, promulgated a new tort, separate from that of
deceit, and in later cases in later centuries, reverted back to the
nomenclature of deceit. There is not enough in Sandforth’s Case to
justify the viability of such an argument, but any attempt to fit the
case into the tort of deceit poses significant difficulties.
A. Categorizing Sandforth’s Case
In his assertion that a case did not lie, Justice Peryam specifically identified the tort doctrine he thought was being invoked as
deceit. At the time Sandforth’s Case was decided, Peryam’s position appears to have been the stronger one; it was supported by the
common law of the day. Even though Peryam’s position appears
to be correct, his rationale was not. Peryam reasoned that a merchant could use any trademark he fancied, including the famous
and successful marks of competitors. The actual reason that Sandforth’s Case should not have been actionable in deceit is that at
least one—and possibly two—elements normally required under
the sixteenth century common law of deceit were missing: a warranty by the defendant and a relationship of privity, or at least a re-
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lationship of trust, between the parties.143
The requirement of a warranty in cases involving deceit was
firmly established within the common law between the fourteenth
and sixteenth centuries. Essentially, an action for deceit would lie
only if the plaintiff could establish that the defendant warranted
goods or services and subsequently breached his warranty.144 In
1604, the Court of the Exchequer confirmed that the warranty rule
prevailed in the British common law.145 A few years later, however, in another case involving the same parties, the court of the
King’s Bench relieved the plaintiff from the burden of showing
that a warranty existed, relying instead on the defendant’s fraudulent intent as an alternative.146 Other cases required privity or
some relationship of trust between the parties as well.147 In Sandforth’s Case, there is no warranty made by the defendant, at least
not made to the plaintiff. Furthermore, it seems clear that there
was no relationship between the parties, either in privity or in trust.
Therefore, Sandforth’s Case does not appear to fit into the common law action for deceit.
Nevertheless, some legal historians have depicted the action for
143. See supra note 27 (discussing reported cases in deceit arising during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries).
144. See S.F.C. MILSOM, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 105, 12630 (1985) (discussing the warranty requirement as applied to the sale of goods in the fifteenth century); S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 276-77,
316-21 (1969) (examining the requisite of a warranty in actions for deceit).
145. Chandelor v. Lopus, 79 ENG. REP. 3, 3-4 (Ex. 1604). Here the Court of Exchequer stated that:
[T]he bear affirmation that it was a bezar-stone, without warranting it to be so,
is no cause of action; and although he knew it to be no bezar-stone, it is not material; for every one in selling his wares will affirm that his wares are good, or
the horse which he sells is sound; yet if he does not warrant them to be so, it is
no cause of action.
Id. The author could find only one case sounding in deceit before the seventeenth century where a court may have relaxed the warranty rule. Commentator’s Note, Caryll’s
Reports, Keil 91, pl 16 (1505), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 516.
146. Lopus v. Chandler, YLS M.S. G.R. 29.17, fo. 157v; YLS M.S. G.R. 29.18, fo.
123v; HLS M.S. 118, fo. 114v (1606), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at
520-22.
147. See, e.g., Lord Mounteagle v. Countess of Worcester, Dyer’s Reports, 121, BL
M.S. Harley 1691, fo. 94 (1555) (requiring privity or a relationship of trust between the
parties); Anon, Year Book, Trinity Term, 11 Edw. IV, fo. 6, pl. 10 (1471); Anon, Year
Book, Michealmas Term, 9 Hen. VI, fo. 53v, pl. 37 (1430).
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deceit as evolving as early as the sixteenth century.148 For example, Professor Baker contends that the term deceit, or its Latin or
French equivalents, were invoked to characterize all kinds of cases
of trespass, devoid of any true basis in the old common law tort of
deceit.149 According to Baker, “[d]eceit [was] featured at one stage
or another in most other actions on the case for wrongs.150 Conversion was a ‘plea of trespass and deceit’ or ‘deceit on the case’;
but here again the deceit was to become, probably by the midsixteenth century, a meaningless allegation.”151
Sandforth’s Case may be an example of the abuse—alluded to
by Baker—of attaching the nomenclature of an established tort to
an action where the facts of the case do not fit the tort’s parameters. The Sandforth court, looking for the nearest analogous doctrine of tort to fit the facts, may have simply settled for deceit. We
will never know this. Moreover, it is unknown whether the action
for deceit had expanded by the time of Sandforth’s Case to ease
the requirements of warranty and privity. Whatever the ultimate
answers to those questions, Sandforth’s Case clearly establishes
trademark infringement as a violation of sixteenth century common
law.
B. Placing Sandforth’s Case in the Commercial and Economic
Context of Sixteenth Century England
Whether the court in Sandforth’s Case created a new tort or
expanded the scope of an action for deceit to encompass trademark
infringement and unfair competition is, at this point, of little consequence. Regardless of its doctrinal basis, the court recognized
that the prevailing economic and commercial realities of the realm
required the promulgation or expansion of the common law to protect merchants against trademark piracy and unfair methods of
competition in the marketplace. Anticipating the substantial development of the law during the Industrial Revolution 250 years
later, the courts of the Elizabethan era witnessed extraordinary

148.
149.
150.
151.

See SPELMAN REPORTS, supra note 90, at 230-32.
Id.
Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).

STOLTE.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:44 PM

AN ANSWER TO SCHECHTER'S CONNUNDRUM

541

economic and commercial growth throughout England and probably had little alternative but to fashion the common law to meet the
exigencies of the times.
With the advent of the Tudor Monarchy,152 the English Middle
Ages came to an end.153 The sixteenth century brought to England
a tremendous growth in commerce and the economy.154 In fact,
during this period, England experienced so much progress in its internal economy as well as its development of external markets that
the century “amounted to a sort of Industrial Revolution.”155
152. The House of Tudor, which assumed hold of the British throne in 1485, produced three of the most dynamic monarchs in English history. The Tudor Monarchy was
ushered in after the bloody Battle of Bosworth Field, when Henry Tudor, a bastard pretender to the throne, vanquished Richard III, thus putting an end to the War of the Roses,
which disrupted English commerce and society for thirty years. See generally J.R.
LANDER, THE WARS OF THE ROSES (1965); JOSEPH R. STRAYER & DANA C. MUNRO, THE
MIDDLE AGES 395-1500, at 500-06 (5th ed. 1970). Henry Tudor was coronated as Henry
VII and his direct future lineage included Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth I,
the death of the latter in 1603 extinguishing the Tudor hold on the British throne.
153. See generally JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN
ITALY (1860) (expressing the view that the late Middle Ages was a period of economic
and cultural decline); F.R.H. DU BOULAY, AN AGE OF AMBITION: ENGLISH SOCIETY IN
THE LATE MIDDLE AGES (1970) (exploring the transformation of social, economic, cultural, and religious forces and institutions at the close of the fifteenth century); J.
HUISZINGA, THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1955) (sharing Burckhardt’s views of the
late Medieval period in England); PERCIVAL HUNT, FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
(1962) (offering the view that the late Middle Ages was less a period of stagnancy and
decline and more a bridge to the Renaissance than generally supposed).
154. See EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 116-51 (1937). Focusing on the notable distinction of the sixteenth century as a passing of one era to another, from the Middle Ages to what we like
to refer to as “modern times,” Professor Cheyney opined that:
The century and a half which extends from the middle years of the fifteenth
century to the close of the sixteenth was, as has been shown, a period remarkable for the extent and variety of its changes in almost every aspect of society.
In the political, intellectual, and religious world the sixteenth century seemed
far removed from the fifteenth. It is not therefore a matter of surprise that economic changes were numerous and fundamental, and that social organization in
town and country alike was completely transformed.
Id. at 120-21; see also GEORGE CLARK, THE WEALTH OF ENGLAND 1496-1760, at 57-89
(1961) (arguing that mercantile enterprise and the development of a money economy resulted in the wide availability and significant surpluses of raw materials and finished
goods during the sixteenth century).
155. J.U. Nef, War and Economic Progress, 1540-1640, ECON. HIST. REV. 25
(1942). England, more than any other country of Europe, tied its economic advancement
to the new science and technology ushered in during the Renaissance. ROWSE, supra
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While land was still the economic basis for making and maintaining family fortunes during the period, the century saw a rise in
local markets, the increasing availability of consumable goods, and
a significant escalation of exports to the continent and other parts
of the world.156 New inventions and technological advances vastly
expanded Britain’s industrial capabilities, thereby increasing the
production and distribution of goods throughout the realm and beyond.157 Moreover, the recent discovery and colonization of North
and South America, and the colonization of parts of India, Asia,
note 123, at 112. According to Professor Rowse:
England achieved the position of leadership in industrial technology and heavy
industry she held till the late nineteenth century largely during the century between the Dissolution and the Civil War [1540-1640]; that Elizabeth’s reign
saw a shift in the centre of progress in both science and technology from the
continent to [England], where more fresh industries were started and more new
kinds of machinery and furnaces were developed than in any other country.
The Renaissance impulse signalised itself in a host of new inventions: the
printing press, the blast furnace, furnaces for separating silver from copper ore,
for using coal in glass making, steel and brick-making for drying malt in brewing, boring rods for exploring underground stata, horse and water driven engines for draining mines—an immense field of development [in England] as
new mines were opened up and old workings deepened; the stocking knitting
frame, the Dutch loom for knitting small wares, besides more specialized scientific devices.
Id. Many historians believe that the seeds of the later Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century were sown during the Elizabethan era. “The rise of industrialism in Great
Britain can be more properly regarded as a long process stretching back to the middle of
the sixteenth century . . . than as a sudden phenomenon associated with the 18th and 19th
centuries.” J.U. Nef, The Progress of Technology and the Growth of Large-Scale Industry in Great Britain, 1540-1640, ECON. HIST. REV. 22 (1934).
156. See CHEYNEY, supra 154, at 136-50; CLARK, supra note 154, at 176-87. In
explaining the economic progress that occurred in England during the reign of Elizabeth,
Professor Rowse states:
There were the striking improvements in industrial and financial technique; the
increased mobility of labour, particularly in the iron, coal and glass industries,
special fields for the new capitalist; the growth of investment in new enterprises, the opening up of markets in America, Asia [and] Africa. In all these
things, England, at length, caught up and went ahead.
ROWSE, supra note 123, at 109.
157. See CHEYNEY, supra note 154, at 138-42. For example, during the middle of
the fourteenth century, the longest list of merchants engaged in any appreciable degree of
commerce contained only 169 names. See id. at 139. By 1500, however, over 3,000
merchants engaged in foreign trade and many thousands more engaged in the native
commerce of England. See id. By the end of the sixteenth century, over 3,500 merchants
traded with the Netherlands alone. See id.
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and Africa during the century, made no small impact on the growth
of British industry.
Local craftsmen and artisans made way for a new class of
businessmen, the merchant-adventurers.158 As a result of this and
the vast expansion of industry and foreign trade in general, the
guilds, which had theretofore dominated as the regulating force in
the English economy, began to decline in membership and influence.159 Schechter demonstrated that it was the guilds that regulated the earliest form of “trademark law” in Great Britain.160 It is
highly probable that the decline of the guilds, the escalation of the
powers of the general government, and the growing influence of
the merchant-adventurers in the English economy converged at this
period in removing the regulation of trademarks from the “guild
jurisprudence” to the common law courts.161

158. See id. at 139-43. There was such a surplus of new finished goods during this
period that England’s export trade flourished. See id. The new wealth also resulted in
the greater desire for foreign luxury items and other types of imports. See id. During the
sixteenth century, Britain’s import-export business was booming. According to Cheyney:
These merchants exported the old articles of English production and to a still
greater extent textile goods, the manufacture of which was growing so rapidly
in England. The export of [raw] wool came to an end during the reign of
Queen Elizabeth, but the export of woven cloth was more than enough to take
its place. There was not so much cloth now imported, but a much greater variety of foodstuffs and wines, of articles of fine manufacture, and of the special
products of the countries to which English trade extended.
Id. at 139. In fact, the merchant-adventurers had become so numerous, wealthy, and influential during the century that they furnished 10 out of the 16 London ships sent to assist the British fleet in destroying the Spanish Armada. See id. at 142.
159. See id. at 135-38.
160. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 38-77.
161. CHEYNEY, supra note 154, at 136-38. According to Cheyney:
Thus the gilds lost the unity of their membership, were weakened by the growth
of industry outside of their sphere of control, superseded by the government in
many of their economic functions, deprived of their administrative, legislative
and jurisdictional freedom, robbed of their religious duties and of the property
which had enabled them to fulfil them, and no longer possessed even the bond
of their dramatic interests. So the fraternities which had embodied so much of
the life of the people of the towns during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries now came to include within their organization fewer and fewer
persons and to affect a smaller and smaller part of their interests. Although the
companies continued to exist into later times, yet long before the close of the
period . . . they had become relatively inconspicuous and insignificant.
Id. at 137.
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With the guilds in decline, the plaintiff in Sandforth’s Case,
and potentially others like him during the sixteenth century, probably viewed the common law courts as a more appropriate forum
for obtaining relief against a trademark pirate. “J.G.,” or whatever
his name may have been, could expect the courts of that period to
render a judgment that made sense in light of the economic and
commercial context of that time. As the Industrial Revolution of
the nineteenth century made it imperative to extend substantial legal protection against trademark infringement and unfair competition, so too did the earlier, more contained “Industrial Revolution”
of the sixteenth century.
CONCLUSION
More than seventy years ago, the legal scholar Frank Schechter
challenged other legal scholars and historians to find a bridge linking the regulation of trademark usage by the medieval English
trade guilds to the later assumption of trademark jurisprudence by
the common law courts of the nineteenth century. Schechter fully
discounted the case of Southern v. How as providing such a bridge.
The recent discovery of Sandforth’s Case now allows us to disregard Southern v. How as the earliest basis for trademark and unfair
competition law in English legal history. Moreover, Sandforth’s
Case, together with the unreported parliamentary action in Longe’s
Case, provide the historical bridge linking guild regulation of
trademarks to the development of trademark jurisprudence by the
common law courts as early as the mid-sixteenth century, 250
years before Sykes v. Sykes, the case that Schechter declared to be
“the first reported case squarely involving the protection of trademarks by an English common law court.”
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APPENDIX
THE COMPLAINT IN SANDFORTH’S CASE
Although the complaint in Sandforth’s Case is somewhat
lengthy, its importance in the history of trademark law makes it
worthy of full review. Accordingly, an annotated version of the
complaint is provided in its entirety as follows:
[The plaintiff, by his attorney, complains]162 that, whereas
the same plaintiff is a clothier, and for 12 years past at T.163
in the county aforesaid used the art and mystery [of making]164 woollen cloths called Reading kerseys, “halfes”
cloths and Bridgewaters,165 and during all that time all such
cloths as he made at T. aforesaid were good and substantial
without any fraud or deception in that behalf; and for the
whole of the aforesaid time he was accustomed to mark
such cloths with the letters ‘J.G.’ and with a sign called a
tucker’s handle;166 and the same plaintiff sold the same
cloths, thus made and marked, through the whole of the
aforesaid time, at T. aforesaid and at C.167 in the aforesaid
county and in various other places within this realm of Eng162. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text).
163. Location unknown. Some versions of Southern v. Hall indicated that the plaintiff operated his business out of Glouchester or somewhere in Glouchestershire.
164. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text).
165. A “kersey” is defined as a “course ribbed woolen cloth for hose and work
clothes woven first in medieval England.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY
1238 (1986). The author could not locate an appropriate definition for the two other
types of garments or cloths.
166. The author could find no definition for a “tucker’s handle.” However, during
the Medieval and Renaissance periods, a “tuck” was a slender sword or rapier.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1923 (3rd ed. 1992). It is
possible that the device used as part of the plaintiff’s trademark was the handle of a
sword. Other potentially relevant definitions for “tucker” are (1) “an attachment on a
sewing machine for making tucks” and (2) a piece of lace or cloth used to fill in the low
neck line of a dress.” WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 100, at 2460. The latter definition asks to compare the word to the use in the phrase “bib and tucker.” Id. The definition for the most likely noun “tuck” identified in the first definition of “tucker” is “a fold
stitched or woven into cloth for the purpose of shortening, decorating or controlling fullness.” Id. A “tucker’s handle” could have been a tool of a clothier’s trade.
167. Location unknown.
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land, and likewise at M.168 in Wales and in various other
places in parts beyond the seas, as well to various merchants and other subjects of this realm of England as to
various other merchants and foreigners; and the buyers
thereof were accustomed for eight years169 last past to buy
those cloths well and substantially made and from wool
marked as above said, from the same J.G.170 at all the aforesaid several places, and to pay for the same cloths as for
good and substantial cloths (the same cloths in truth being
good and substantial), upon the affirmation of the same
plaintiff and his servants and factors that the same cloths
were good and substantial, without any inspection or contradiction of the same cloths;171 and by reason thereof the
same plaintiff throughout the aforesaid time lawfully and
honestly obtained and acquired much gain and profit from
the making and selling of such cloths, for the further support and living of the same plaintiff and his whole family:
[nevertheless]172 the defendant, being not unaware of the
foregoing, scheming and plotting to hinder the same plaintiff in selling such cloths of his and to take away and
worsen the opinion and esteem which the aforesaid merchants and subjects had concerning the cloths of the same
plaintiff, for the space of two years now past at T. aforesaid
made various woollen cloths called etc. which were ill, insufficient and unmerchantable; and deceitfully marked the
same cloths with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and with the
aforesaid mark called a tucker’s handle; and exposed for
sale the same cloths, so insufficiently and deceitfully made
and marked as aforesaid, in the aforesaid several places, as
the cloths of the same plaintiff and under the aforesaid

168. Location unknown.
169. The document previously states that the plaintiff had manufactured and marketed his cloths for twelve years, not eight.
170. Only the initials of the plaintiff are given.
171. This would seem to indicate that the plaintiff argued for the inherent “informational” value his mark had to consumers. The plaintiff’s customers need not spend time
and effort inspecting the nature and quality of each cloth since the customers’ association
of the plaintiff’s trademark with high quality goods had already been established.
172. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text).
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mark and letters, in the name of the selfsame plaintiff,173
whereupon various merchants and other subjects who were
buyers and had previously been accustomed to buy the
same plaintiff’s cloths, trusting to the aforesaid words and
[seeing] the aforesaid cloths marked with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and the aforesaid mark called a tucker’s handle,
bought the same cloths (deceitfully and insufficiently made
by the defendant aforesaid) from the same defendant, without further inspection or contradiction of the same cloths,
as being good and substantial cloths such as the cloths of
the same plaintiff had used to be, and as being the same
plaintiff’s cloths; and the aforesaid buyers, when they later
inspected the aforesaid cloths deceitfully sold by the aforesaid defendant as aforesaid, and found the aforesaid cloths
to be deceitful, insufficient and unmerchantable, both in
length and width and in quality and substance of the same
cloths, not only completely reversed the opinion and esteem which they had previously had of the same cloths but
also gave notice to many other merchants and subjects of
the deceitful and insufficient making of the aforesaid
cloths; and as a result of this same plaintiff, when he recently desired to sell certain good and substantial cloths of
his (marked in form aforesaid) at the aforesaid places, and
there exposed the same cloths for sale, could not sell those
good and substantial cloths (marked in form aforesaid) by
reason of the deceit committed and used by the aforesaid
defendant as set out above, but the merchants and subjects
aforesaid who previously used to buy such cloths from the
same plaintiff refused to buy the same cloths from him by
reason of the aforesaid deceit; to the damage etc.174

173. This may mean that the defendant assumed the imposture of the plaintiff himself when actually making his sales, or that he stated himself to be the latter’s agent, and
therefore authorized by the plaintiff to make the sales.
174. Sandforth’s Case, BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615-17 (citing Cory’s
Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. (British Library) (1584)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (footnotes added).

